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Abstract
A common problem arising in many domains is how value the beneﬁts of projects
in a project portfolio. Recently, there has been some attention given to a decision
analysis practice whereby analysts deﬁne a value function on some criterion by
setting 0 as the value of the worst project. In particular, Clemen and Smith
have argued this practice is not sound as it gives diﬀerent results from the case
where projects are ”priced out”, and makes a strong implicit assumption about
the value of not doing a project. In this paper we underscore the criticism of this
way of using value functions by showing it can lead to a rank reversal. We provide
a measurement theoretic account of the phenomenon, showing that the problem
arises from using evaluating projects on an interval scale (such as a value scale)
whereas to guard against such rank reversals, beneﬁts must be measured on at least
a ratio scale. Seen from this perspective, we discuss how the solution proposed by
Clemen and Smith, of explicitly reformulating the underlying optimisation problem
to allow for explicitly non-zero values, addresses the issue, and explore in what
sense it may be open to similar problems. In closing we discuss what lessons from
practice may be drawn from this analysis, focussing on settings where the Clemen
and Smith proposal may not be the most natural way of modelling.
Keywords: Decision analysis, Portfolio Decision Analysis, multicriteria decision
analysis (MCDA)
1. Introduction
All organisations have to decide which activities (out of a set of possible ac-
tivities) they will initiate, which they will continue, and which they will stop.
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Supporting such decisions by evaluating projects and assessing the beneﬁts of pos-
sible portfolios as a function of the component projects represents a signiﬁcant
part of the professional work of many analysts. The application of decision analy-
sis in such settings is often referred to as ”Portfolio Decision Analysis”: Portfolio
Decision Analysis seeks to provide frameworks for performing portfolio analysis in
a way which allows a rigorous treatment of issues of value and uncertainty. Klein-
muntz (2007) and Phillips and Bana e Costa (2007) have provided overviews of
past work, and personal statements of what good practice looks like. The edited
volume by Salo, Keisler and Morton (2011) provides a range of perspectives on
theory and practice in this area.
A common practice in Portfolio Decision Analysis in a multicriteria setting is to
deﬁne criterion-speciﬁc value functions by setting 0, the baseline for measurement,
as the value of the worst item, as recommended by Phillips and Bana e Costa (2007,
p 57) and implicitly recommended Kirkwood (1996); see for example Kirkwood’s
example of Section 8.1 and the discussion in footnote 3 of Clemen and Smith
(2009). These scores are then summed up across criteria to give an overall project
score, and summed across the constituent projects to give an overall portfolio
score. Clemen and Smith (2009) (henceforth, ”CS”) argue that it is not a sound
approach to analysis as it gives diﬀerent results from the case where projects are
”priced out”, and makes a strong implicit assumption about the value of not doing
a project. As a solution, they advocate explicitly assigning project-speciﬁc value
scores for not doing particular projects.
A number of scholars have sought to build on the work of CS. In particular,
Liesio¨ and Punkka (2014) have explored how to elicit a suitable baseline value and
also provide techniques for exploring sensitivity of the solutions recommended by
a particular decision model to uncertainty about the appropriate baseline values.
de Almeida et al. (2014) explore three consequences of rescaling the valuations
of projects in a portfolio setting, which they dub the portfolio size eﬀect, the
baseline eﬀect, and the issue of consistency across diﬀerent aggregation sequences;
and de Almeida and Vetschera (2012) explore a similar issue in the context of the
PROMTETHEE multicriteria method.
CS demonstrate by citing and describing in some detail numerous published
examples that this practice is widespread. Notably, they cite an application to
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capital budgeting in healthcare (Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz, 1999); an applica-
tion to project selection in a telecommunications company (Linstedt et al., 2008);
and a military portfolio optimisation (Parnell et al., 2002). They comment that
that this list is not exhaustive and they ”have found similar issues in many studies”
(p 262). This author has had the same experience. For example, in the con-
text of R&D prioritisation, Morcos (2008) recommends expressing scores ”along
a value scale with intervals from 0 (least desirable) to 100 (most desirable)” (p
77). (Examination of the ﬁgures in this paper suggests that he departs from this
rule in the case of one criterion, ”proﬁtability” but adheres to it for the ”risk” and
”reliability” criteria.) Similarly Baltussen and Niessen (2006) present an illustra-
tive example of multicriteria techniques to priority setting in healthcare (in which
the task is to rank order projects with a view to deciding what subset of them to
undertake) in which the zero has been set at the level of the least preferred project
on three of four criteria (for the fourth criterion, ”severity of disease”, the projects
are given between one and four stars, and the zero is set at one star). The reason
for the pervasiveness of this practice seems to be that setting the zero at the level
of the least preferred alternative is standard, unproblematic and uncontested ad-
vice in the context where one is choosing a single item from a set. Many authors
generalise this advice to the setting where the task is to choose multiple objects
from a set.
In this paper we will study the setting of baselines from a measurement theo-
retic point of view. Seen from this perspective, the issue is one which has surfaced
in diﬀerent forms in the literature over the years. In particular, Rao and Weiss
(1986) provide a numerical exploration (in the context of a particular application)
of the number of possible ways of ranking items in beneﬁt/ cost order when the
beneﬁt scores of individual items are translated by a constant. Roberts (1990)
provides an introduction to the theory of measurement and explores how it may
be relevant in the context of combinatorial optimization problems: he observes
that one can only be sure that the solution to a combinatorial optimization prob-
lem will be invariant with respect to monotonically increasing transformations of
its objective function coeﬃcients when the optimizing algorithm uses only ordinal
information about these coeﬃcients (for example, a greedy algorithm).
The contribution of this paper will be to study the practice discussed by CS
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and answer the following questions.
1. Can we get a clear view of what goes wrong when we use value functions to
value projects multicriteria portfolio decision analysis?
2. What are the speciﬁc characteristics of value functions which give rise to this
problem? Might this problem apply more generally when project beneﬁts
are assessed in some other way? In what way is this a speciﬁcally portfolio
problem?
3. Why does the solution proposed by CS ”work” to resolve this problem? Is the
solution proposed by CS vulnerable to other similar and related problems?
4. How important is the separability of the rule for combining project beneﬁt
values as overall portfolio beneﬁts in this analysis? Do the results we obtain
for this rule give insights into what should happen in a more general setting?
5. What, practically speaking, can we learn from this analysis about how to
perform better and more robust analysis?
The structure of the paper will be as follows. Section 2 will answer question
1. Section 3 will provide the analytic framework to answer the second and third
groups of questions, which will be dealt with in Sections 4 and 5 respectively.
Section 6 answers the fourth group of questions and Section 7 returns to the
example of Section 2 to answer the question 5. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2. Background
In this section we try to get a clear ﬁx on the problem under consideration.
To do so, consider the following example, which is smaller and thus hopefully
gives a more direct insight into what is going on than that of CS. A government
funded medical research institute has four research projects on the table. These
projects will reduce mortality and contribute to scientiﬁc understanding, and the
company cares both about the immediate medical and broader scientiﬁc beneﬁts.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that the projects have the proﬁle of costs and beneﬁts shown
in Table 1.
Senior management’s value function over each of the two criteria is assessed as
shown in Table 2, with values scores for each criterion referred to as Vmortality and
Vscience respectively.
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Reduced mortality Scientiﬁc impact Costs (£’000s)
a 6,000 lives saved Excellent 200
b 4,000 lives saved Good 100
c 4,000 lives saved Good 100
d 3,000 lives saved Neutral 100
Table 1: Values and costs data
Vmortality Vscience Costs (£’000s)
a 1 1 200
b 1/3 1/2 100
c 1/3 1/2 100
d 0 0 100
Table 2: Values and costs data
Suppose we are seeking to maximize total beneﬁts with a budget of £200,000
and we compute the values of portfolios as the values of the constituent projects.
Irrespective of the weights applied, from the data of Table 2, the most attractive
portfolio seems to be {a} which yields one unit on the scale of Vmortality, and one
unit of value on the scale of Vscience , whereas {b, c} yields only 2/3 on the scale
of Vmortality. At this point we might start to have doubts about the soundness of
this procedure, as {b, c} will save 8,000 people whereas {a} will save only 6,000,
and so if saving lives is weighted heavily, {b, c} should appear more attractive.
Such doubts are reinforced if we add a project e which saves 1,000 lives, has
neutral scientiﬁc impact and costs £100,000 to the project list. In this case, we
rescale the values to obtain the data shown in Table 3.
Vmortality Vscience Costs (£’000s)
a 1 1 200
b 3/5 1/2 100
c 3/5 1/2 100
d 2/5 0 100
e 0 0 100
Table 3: Revised Values and costs
Now {b, c} is the most highly valued portfolio whatever weights are applied.
So the ordering of portfolios induced by this procedure may change when items
are added to the choice set. In other words, we can observe a rank reversal
5
induced by the rescaling of the value function - a sure sign that we have done
something problematic. Note that this phenomenon does not arise because of
the linear transformation itself (as a monotonically increasing transformation this
cannot change the ordering of projects within a criterion) but rather arises because
of an interaction between the linear transformation and the use of an additive
combination rule to compute overall portfolio scores. In any case, the rank reversal
is a violation of the principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, according
to which the preference for {a} over {b, c} or vice versa should not depend on
whether portfolios including e are members of the choice set. Violation of this
same principle has led many decision analysts to reject the Analytic Hierarchy
Process as a method for supporting multicriteria choice (see e.g. Belton and Gear,
1983; Dyer, 1990; Salo and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, 1997).
3. Derived measurement, consistency and invariance
In the technical part of this paper, we will address the following problem:
suppose you have a set of beneﬁt numbers, and the numbers are measured on a
particular scale, and the numbers are combined in a particular way to give an
overall portfolio value, what does the class of admissible transformations of the
underlying scale have to be in order to avoid the sort of rank reversal problem
which the example demonstrates? This problem embraces the question of what
goes wrong with the decision analysis procedure discussed above, but casts it in
a more general setting. Practising analysts – whether decision analysts or not –
have numbers (such as beneﬁt scores), and they do operations on these numbers
(such as adding them up to come up with overall portfolio values), but are they
doing this in an appropriate way?
The framework we will use for studying this question is that of derived measure-
ment (Suppes and Zinnes, 1963). The canonical example of derived measurement
is density. The story is that someone has measured mass M and volume V by
bringing some measurement technology to bear on some objects. We obtain these
measurements and calculate the derived measurement (density) as M
V
using these
original (or fundamental) measurements. If object 1 has massM1 and volume V1
and object 2 has massM2 and volume V2 we say ”object 1 is denser than object 2”
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if M1
V1
> M2
V2
. But can we be sure that if mass or volume had been measured using
some diﬀerent scale we would still be led to the same conclusion about relative
densities?
In our approach we start with a (ﬁnite) set of objects A which are the objects
of choice and a binary preference order % over A. When we say % is a preference
relation we mean it is complete and transitive and so is representable by a real-
valued function. The indiﬀerence relation ∼ and strict preference relation ≻ are
deﬁned in the usual way. We will be interested in the situation where we can
compute a derived measurement which represents our preferences in the following
sense.
Definition 1. A relation % on A is represented by the function v : A 7→ R
iﬀ a′ % a′′ ⇔ v (a′) ≥ v (a′′) ∀a′, a′′ ∈ A.
The conditions for the existence of representing functions of various forms are
well-known (Fishburn, 1970, Krantz et al, 1971).
We will suppose that the contents of A are vectors of decisions and mea-
surements, formally that A = Rkn × {0, 1}n for some positive integer n and
k ∈ {1, 2}. The intended interpretation of the {0, 1}n is that there are n
things which we could or could not do. The intended interpretation of the
Rkn is that associated with each decision xi there is a vector of measurements
zi of dimensionality equal to k. Hence a generic element of A will be written as
(z, x) = ((z1, ..., zi, ..., zn), (x1, ..., xi, ..., xn)).
We restrict our focus in this paper to situations in which we are faced with
binary decisions. In fact, often decisions can be thought of as polychotomous in
the sense that one can choose diﬀerent levels of diﬀerent levels of investment (e.g.
”bronze”, ”silver” and ”gold”) in a project or area. Incorporating polychotomous
investment decisions would not be diﬃcult technically but this would render the
notation more cumbersome, without providing additional insights.
The speciﬁc nature of these measurements (and of the associated technology)
is purposely left undeﬁned: measurements could be directly assessed subjective
values, elicited using standard decision analytic techniques (von Winterfeldt and
Edwards, 1986); judgmental assessments of beneﬁts which could be at least in
principle measurable once the project is implemented using techniques drawn from
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professional disciplines such as accounting or epidemiology; or actual physical mea-
surements (e.g. in the situation where the DM is interested in purchasing scrap
metal and she may be able to weigh potential purchases). We highlight that we
do not assume that these measurements are values assigned by a value function,
although they could be.
The measurement system is such that a family of permissible transformations
of the numbers are possible (for example revenues may be measured in British £
and we wish to convert them into e). We call this family F : the contents of
F are functions f : Rkn 7→ Rkn. By a harmless abuse of notation we will also
use f to denote a function which maps Rkn × {0, 1}n into itself and is deﬁned by
f(z, x) = (f(z), x), and F to be the set of such functions. Associated with each
f ∈ F (extended in this way) is a preference ordering R(f) on A. The indiﬀerence
relation I(f) will be deﬁned in the usual way. A set of functions and associated
preference relations will be written 〈F ,R〉.
Next, we deﬁne a notion of consistency.
Definition 2. A set of functions and associated relations 〈F ,R〉 is consistent
with % iﬀ a′ % a′′ ⇔ f(a′) R(f)f(a′′) ∀a′ , a′′ ∈ A, ∀f ∈ F .
In the ensuing ”with %” will be understood and we will just write ”consistent”.
Clearly this concept of consistency can be interpreted as ruling out rank re-
versals when we perform some operation on the project beneﬁt scores (such as
rescaling them as we did in the example of the previous section).
We wish to distinguish consistency from another condition.
Definition 3. A relation % is F−invariant if a′ % a′′ ⇔ f(a′) % f(a′′)∀a′
, a′′ ∈ A, ∀f ∈ F .
Intuitively, invariance would apply (for example) if, presented with a vector
of numbers representing revenues from a set of projects we could undertake, and,
when asked whether it would make a material diﬀerence to our preferences over
portfolios of projects whether the currency in which these revenues were denomi-
nated was $, £, e, or U, we reply ”no, it does not matter”. This would be the
case if our value function was strictly monotonically increasing, but not if we had
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some particular threshold such we are indiﬀerent to all levels of money above it.
(We might ﬁnd it hard to imagine what to do with the second billion e or £, but
not with the second billion U.) Indeed, this is the diﬀerence between invariance
and consistency: with consistency we are allowed to change the threshold when
we rescale, with invariance not.
It is pretty clear that invariance is stronger than consistency, in the following
sense:
Proposition 1. If % is F−invariant, and R(f) is defined by % ∀f ∈ F then
〈F ,R〉 is consistent.
To give an example where we might have preferences which are consistent but
not F−invariant, suppose that F = {f(z) = z − 2} and % is deﬁned by z′ % z′′
iﬀ −(z′ − 2)2 ≥ −(z′′ − 2)2. Then 2 ≻ 3 but f(3) = 1 ≻ 0 = f(2), so % is
not F−invariant. But if we deﬁne f(z′)R(f)f(z′′) by −f(z′)2 ≥ −f(z′′)2, then
〈F ,R〉 is consistent.
Obviously consistency is desirable from a normative point of view. Once we
have converted £ into e or vice versa we should not ﬁnd ourselves changing our
minds about the attractiveness of our investments. However, it is also pretty weak
by itself. In the ensuing we will have to supplement consistency by assuming the
functions which represent % and R(f) have some particular functional form. This
will make it possible to derive interesting results. Invariance, on the other hand,
is a strong and normatively signiﬁcant assumption, which can be used as the basis
for representation theorems (see e.g. Sen, 1977).
4. One-part portfolio models
The setting for our ﬁrst model is that we are confronted by n ≥ 2 ”projects”
in which we can invest, and these projects have beneﬁts if implemented. We have
a measurement technology which maps the set of projects into Rn (i.e. k = 1) and
an element in this space will be called b = (b1, ..., bn). The intended interpretation
of such a point is that it corresponds to a set of projects where bi is delivered
through project i. In terms of our derived measurement framework, this vector b
is a fundamental measurement. If we then compute, as a derived measurement,
the value of the portfolio, and we want this measurement to be consistent, what
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properties do we require of the underlying measurement technology from which we
obtain b?
The precise answer turns out to depend on the formula which is used to compute
the overall portfolio value. The most natural formula is as follows.
Definition 4. If % on {0, 1}n×Rn is represented by
∑
i
bixi say it is represented
by a one-part additive portfolio model.
The function
∑
i
bixi is the function recommended by Kirkwood (1996), and
which CS criticise as neglecting to explicitly draw attention to the value of not
doing a project. The intended interpretation is that if a project i is done (xi = 1)
then a beneﬁt bi is realized.
An important class of admissible transformations is as follows:
Definition 5. The set S of similarity transformations with common scal-
ing factor is the set {f(·)|∃α ∈ R++, : f(b) = αb ∀b ∈ Rn}.
Obviously any similarity transformation of the underlying data will leave the
preference ordering represented by
∑
i
bixi unchanged, but are there other transfor-
mations which have this property? The answer is no.
Proposition 2. If 〈F ,R〉 is consistent and % and R(f)are represented by a one-
part additive portfolio model ∀f ∈ F , then F ⊆ S.
Proof. We develop the proof for the case n = 2: other cases are similar. We will
write the representing portfolio model as v(·). Take an arbitrary f ∈ F . First
observe that because both ((b, 0), (1, 0)) and ((b, 0), (1, 1)) have value b:
((b, 0), (1, 0)) ∼ ((b, 0), (1, 1)) (1)
Now, by consistency:
((f1(b), f2(0)), (1, 0))I(f)((f1(b), f2(0)), (1, 1)) (2)
Hence by representability v((f1(b), f2(0)), (1, 0)) = v((f1(b), f2(0)), (1, 1)) =⇒ f1(b) =
f1(b) + f2(0) =⇒ f2(0) = 0. (Note that this conclusion is unaﬀected even if
we transform v(·) by some strictly increasing transformation ψ; we can always
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solve the resulting equation by transforming both sides by ψ−1 to retrieve f1(b) =
f1(b) + f2(0)). By a parallel argument f1(0) = 0.
Now note that because % is represented by a one-part additive value function,
((b, 0), (1, 1)) ∼ ((0, b), (1, 1)) (3)
Hence, by consistency:
((f1(b), f2(0)), (1, 1))I(f)((f1(0), f2(b)), (1, 1)) (4)
Hence, by representability f1(b)+f2(0) =f1(0)+f2(b) =⇒ f1(b) =f2(b)∀b. Hence-
forth write φ for both f1 and f2.
Now observe that:
((b1, b2), (1, 1)) ∼ ((b1 + b2, 0), (1, 1)) (5)
Hence, by consistency again:
((φ(b1), φ(b2)), (1, 1))I(f)((φ(b1 + b2), φ(0)), (1, 1)) (6)
From which we can conclude that φ(b1)+φ(b2) = φ(b1+ b2), which is a Cauchy
functional equation. As is well-known (Acze´l, 2006), the only solution to this
equation is φ(b) = αb. Hence the result is proved.
Recall that an absolute scale is one where no transformations are permissible;
a ratio scale is one where similarity transformations (ie multiplication by a scaling
factor) are permissible; and an interval scale is one where aﬃne transformations
(multiplication by a scaling factor and addition of a positive constant) are permis-
sible. So the implication of Proposition 2 is that if the project beneﬁt scores are
measured on an absolute scale, no rank reversal is possible; if they are measured
on a ratio scale, no rank reversal is possible; but if they are measured on (for ex-
ample) an interval scale, then a rank reversal can occur, indicating that we have a
problem. Value functions are generally taken to be measured on an interval scale,
and it is this which justiﬁes the rescaling as the option set changes, which in turn
gives rise to the rank reversal described in Section 2.
It is important to realise that the above analysis applies only to settings where
we are making portfolio choices. In settings where we are choosing one item from
a set, deﬁning value functions in this way and choosing the item with the high-
est value is unproblematic advice. It is also important to realise that the set of
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consistent transformations (ie transformations which do not induce a rank rever-
sal) is dependent on the choice of portfolio model. For example, if the portfolio
model is max
i
{bixi} then F can contain any strictly increasing function without
fear of inducing an inconsistency (the best portfolios are those which contain the
best project, and no strictly increasing transformation will change the ranking of
the projects), and so rescalings are unproblematic, as long as the beneﬁts of all
projects are rescaled by the same amount. To take another example, if the portfo-
lio model is Π
i
bixi then F can be contained in the following set without introducing
an inconsistency:
Definition 6. The setW of weighted power transformations is the set {f(·)|∃αi ∈
R++, ∃p ∈ R++ : f i(r) = αirp ∀r ∈ R}.
In other words, the range of transformations which may feature in F without
inducing an inconsistency is enlarged - but nevertheless, measuring beneﬁts on
interval scales which permit a change in zero point (for example, value functions)
is still problematic even with this choice of one-part additive portfolio model.
5. Two-part portfolio models
In the second formalisation we have n ≥ 2 ”sectors” in which we can invest
or not. Investing in a sector leads to diﬀerent outcomes than if we had not
invested. Sectors could be locations, or diseases, or physical installations, such
as roads or ﬂood defences; if one is planning ﬂood defences, the decision could be
to upgrade from sand defences to concrete. We have a measurement technology
which measures the outcomes associated with investing and not investing, i.e now
our measurement technology produces 2n measurements (k = 2). Speciﬁcally,
associated with each sector i we have a measurement of the outcome zi in the case
where we invest and zi in the case where we do not invest. Write zi = (zi, zi).
These are our fundamental measurements in this setup. Again we are agnostic
about what these outcomes are: they could be subjectively assessed values or
wealth levels, number of premature deaths from illness, or expected monetized
damage from ﬂooding.
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We use a model of the form
∑
i
(
zixi + zi(1 − xi)
)
as a representing portfolio
function for these preferences (this is the model which is recommended in CS as
equation (3)). It will be noted that when this model
∑
i
(
zixi + zi(1− xi)
)
is used
the conclusions of the previous section do not hold: in particular, a transformation
of the form fi(zi) = zi+β applied to both zi and zi will obviously leave the ranking
of solutions induced by this portfolio model unchanged.
Definition 7. If % is represented by
∑
i
(
zixi + zi(1− xi)
)
say it is represented
by a two-part additive portfolio model.
We deﬁne the following set of transformations. Note that α is a scalar and β
is a vector.
Definition 8. The set A of affine transformations with a common scaling
factor is the set {f(·)|∃α ∈ R++, ∃β ∈ Rn : f(z) = αz + β∀z ∈ Rn}.
As in the previous section, the transformations in the designated set are the
only transformations to leave the preference ordering unchanged.
Proposition 3. If 〈F ,R〉 is consistent and % and R(f)are represented by a two-
part additive portfolio model ∀f ∈ F , then F ⊆ A.
Proof. Take an arbitrary f ∈ F . Observe that the indiﬀerence ((z, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0)) ∼
((0, 0), (z, 0)(0, 1)) follows from representability. Hence from consistency:
(((f1(z), f1(0)) , (f2(0), f2(0))) , (1, 0)) I(f) (((f1(0), f1(0)) , (f2(z), f2(0))) , (0, 1)))
(7)
from this it follows that:
f1(z) + f2(0) = f1(0) + f2(z) (8)
or in other words, f1(z) and f2(z) diﬀer only in a constant term. Call this
term κ and write f2(z) = f1(z)+κ.
Now observe that (((z1, 0), (z2, 0)), (1, 1)) ∼ (((z1 + z2, 0), (0, 0)), (1, 1)) and
hence:
(((f1(z1), f1(0)) , (f1(z2) + κ, f1(0) + κ)) , (1, 1)) I(f)
(((f1(z1 + z2), f1(0)) , (f1(0) + κ, f1(0) + κ)) , (1, 1)) (9)
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Because the κs cancel, it follows that:
f1(z1) + f1(z2) = f1(z1 + z2) + f1(0) (10)
This is equivalent to:
f1(z1)− f1(0) + f1(z2)− f1(0) = f1(z1 + z2)− f1(0) (11)
Hence we can deﬁne γ(z) = f1(z) − f1(0) and obtain the following functional
equation:
γ(z1) + γ(z2) = γ(z1 + z2) (12)
This is the Cauchy equation again, so γ(z) = αz. Write β1 = f1(0) and
β2 = f1(0) + κ and we have an aﬃne transformation with common scaling factor
as claimed.
Hence, for these two part functions, using value functions (or other measure-
ment technologies) which provide interval valued measurements, does not represent
a threat to consistency and place us at risk of inducing a rank reversal.
Does this mean that we can disregard nature of the scales on which the out-
comes are measured when using such two-part models? Absolutely not! Consider
the following example.
Example 1. Suppose outcomes are measured on an ordinal scale, and portfolios
are evaluated by a two-part additive model. Consider the following data shown in
Table 4 for some evaluation problem.
z z Costs (£’000s)
a 3 1 100
b 3 1 100
c 4 1 200
Table 4: Outcomes and cost data
Suppose we have a budget of £200,000. The optimal choice is portfolio {a, b}
because the value of the model
∑
i
zixi+
∑
i
zi(1− xi) is 3 + 3+ 1 = 7 whereas if we
choose {c} we obtain 1 + 1 + 4 = 6. However, if a transformation f(z) = z3 is
applied to the zs and zs (since all strictly increasing transformations of an ordinal
scale are permissible), then the data become as shown in Table 5.
Now if we apply the formula
∑
f(
i
zi)xi+
∑
f(
i
zi)(1 − xi) {a, b} is associated
with an value of 27 + 27 + 1 = 55 and {c} with a value of 64 + 1 + 1 = 66 so the
order has reversed.
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f(z) f(z) Costs (£’000s)
a 27 1 100
b 27 1 100
c 64 1 200
Table 5: Transformed outcome and costs data
Comparing Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 gives us some insight into why us-
ing value functions (or indeed any measurement technology which produces num-
bers measured on an interval scale) to evaluate beneﬁts is problematic in the case
of a one-part additive portfolio model but non-problematic in the case of a two-part
additive portfolio model. However, Example 1 shows us that we would experience
a problem exactly analogous to the problem of Section 2 when using a two part
function additive portfolio model if we were to use a technology which produced
measurements on an ordinal scale to measure beneﬁts.
Moreover, our positive conclusion that it is safe to choose an interval scale when
using a two-part portfolio model is not necessarily good if the model in question
does not have an additive form - for example a model with the multiplicative form
Π
i
(
zixi + zi(1− xi)
)
. Consider the following example.
Example 2. We are seeking to build a small research team, and we need a math-
ematician (m) and a programmer (p). We have people with both these skills in
house, but we have some funds and can hire either a better m or a better p (but
not both). We rate both existing and potential new hire ms and ps on a zero to
100 scale as follows, with z denoting the score for the new hire and z denoting the
score for the existing staff, as in Table 6.
z z
m 48 30
p 60 40
Table 6: Original staff evaluations
We believe that mathematics and programming are complementary skills and so
we combine scores multiplicatively to arrive an overall score for the team. Within
our budget constraint, we have two possibilities – the portfolio containing the new
m and the existing p with a total score of 48×40 = 1920 or the portfolio containing
the existing m and new p with a total score of 30× 60 = 1800. So clearly choosing
to hire the new mathematician is the way to go. However, we have a second
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thought - these are skilled professionals, so surely we should start the scale at 100
instead of zero and go up to 200? We thus transform our scores by the function
g(z) = z + 100. This gives us new scores as shown in Table 7.
g(z) g(z)
m 148 130
p 160 140
Table 7: Transformed staff evaluations
Now we recompute the portfolio scores. This time, the portfolio containing the
new m and the existing p has a total score of 148× 140 = 20720 and the portfolio
containing the existing m and new p has a total score of 130× 160 = 20800, so it
seems now we should hire the new programmer instead.
In this case we have performed an aﬃne transformation of the underlying scale –
quite permissible if the scale is indeed an interval scale – and have obtained a rank
reversal, even though we are using a two-part model. This is not a coincidence, and
in fact it can be shown (using the same line of reasoning as that of Propositions 2
and 3) that in the case of a two-part multiplicative model the only transformations
of the underlying scales which preserve consistency are those in the set W , as
introduced in the last section.
6. Beyond separable models
So far in this paper, we have identiﬁed admissible transformations of underlying
data which preserve particular value models. However, a possible objection to this
analysis is that we have so far focussed exclusively on additive and other separable
value models. This is a signiﬁcant restriction in a portfolio context as often
there will be interactions between decisions about particular projects or particular
sectors. For example, the value of investing in secondary care facilities for people
suﬀering from stroke or advanced kidney disease may depend on whether one has
also invested in preventive activity for these conditions; to the extent that one has
not invested in prevention, one can expect secondary care facilities to have higher
utilization and thus add more value.
An interesting instance of this sort of model is described in Mild and Salo
(2009). These authors describe an application undertaken for the Finnish Road
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Administration where particular proﬁles of maintenance decisions are mapped into
a descriptive system which captures the distribution of the various elements of the
road infrastructure across a number of quality classes. This in turn is mapped by
a multiattribute value function with four criteria representing road safety, asset
value preservation, customer satisfaction and environmental aspects, into a value
score. In our terms, one can think of this formal apparatus as a device for
mapping a proﬁle of decisions into an outcome space, with non-zero outcomes
associated both with choosing both with ”doing” and ”not doing” a particular piece
of maintenance. Such a model ”feels like” a two-part model but the outcome values
need not combine additively over sectors (for example, in the Mild and Salo (2009)
model, as there is a Markov chain which governs the degradation of the roads over
time, a maintenance action in one period may interact with a maintenance action
in a subsequent period).
Is there anything we can say, then, about these situations where we do not
have separability between decisions? It turns out there is. To see what may be
generalizable to this more complex environment, make the following deﬁnition:
Definition 9. The set T of translations is the set {f(·)|∃β ∈ Rn, : f(b) = b+ β
∀b ∈ Rn}.
One of the striking feature of the previous section has been that the project
value models of Section 4 are not consistent with respect to sets of data transfor-
mations containing T (even the portfolio model max
i
{bixi} requires us to transform
each project score by the same monotonic function), whereas the sector value mod-
els of Section 5 may be (for example the class of consistent transformations of the
two part additive model is a superset of T ).
To see how this insight applies in a more general setting, in this section, rather
than studying relations represented by particular functions, we study a property
imposed on the relation itself directly. We continue to suppose that % is a prefer-
ence ordering but no longer suppose that it has an explicit representation through
a speciﬁc portfolio model. Instead we will be interested in the following property.
Definition 10 (PC). A preference relation % over A = Rkn×{0, 1}n (k ∈ {1, 2})
will be said to be one-part coherent if (i) (0kn,1n) ∼ (0kn,0n) and (ii) (z′,0n) ∼
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(z′′,0n)∀z′, z′′ ∈ Rkn where 0kn,0n are the zero vectors of dimensionality kn and
n respectively, and 1n is a vector of ones of dimensionality n.
Thus, part (i) of one-part coherence captures the idea that a zero on the beneﬁt
scale has the meaning that one is indiﬀerent between doing a project and not doing
it. Part (ii) says that if one does not do any project, it does not matter how much
beneﬁt would have been realized had one done some.
It is interesting to compare with this what one may think of as the essential
features of the two-part representation. Consider the following axiom.
Definition 11 (SC). A preference relation % over A = R2n × {0, 1}n will be
called two-part coherent if
((z
1
, z1), ..., (zi , zi), ..., (zn, zn)), (x1, ..., 1, ..., xn))
∼ ((z
1
, z1), ..., (zi, zi), ..., (zn, zn)), (x1, ..., 0, ..., xn))
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}, ∀(z
1
, z1), ..., (zi−1, zi−1), (zi+1, zi+1), ..., (zn, zn)) ∈ R
2(n−1) and
∀zi, zi , zi ∈ R.
This axiom captures the idea that whether one obtains z
i
from choosing 1 or
from choosing 0 is a matter of indiﬀerence: it is the same z
i
in either case.
We also need a very mild axiom.
Definition 12. A preference relation % over A = Rkn×{0, 1}n will be said to be
essential if ∃z′, z′′ ∈ Rkn : (z′,1n) ≻ (z′′,1n).
To see that one-part and two-part coherence are very diﬀerent ideas, consider
the following result.
Proposition 4. No preference relation % over A = R2n × {0, 1}n can be both
one-part coherent, two-part coherent and essential.
Proof. For conciseness, write z = [(z
i
, zi)]. Choose z
′ = [(z′
i
, z′i)], z
′′ = [(z′′
i
, z′′i )] :
(z′,1n) ≻ (z′′,1n). By part (ii) of PC, ([(z′i, z
′
i
)],0n) ∼ ([(z′′i , z
′′
i
)],0n) ∀z′i, z
′′
i ∈ R.
By SC, ([(z′i, z
′
i
)],0n) ∼([(z′
i
, z′i)],1
n) and ([(z′′i , z
′′
i
)],0n) ∼([(z′′
i
, z′′i )],1
n). From
the transitivity of indiﬀerence, we can conclude (z′,1n) = ([(z′
i
, z′i)],1
n) ∼([(z′′
i
, z′′i )],1
n) =
(z′′,1n) which is a contradiction to essentiality.
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We are able to prove an impossibility theorem for one-part coherence.
Theorem 3. For all preference relations % over A = Rn × {0, 1}n, if 〈F ,R〉
is consistent and % and R(f) are essential and one-part coherent ∀f ∈ F then
T * F .
Proof. Suppose T ⊆ F and consider z′ and z′′ distinct such that (z′,1n) ≻
(z′′,1n) . Now apply the transformation fi(zi) = zi − z
′
i ∀i to z
′ to obtain:
((f1(z1), ..., fn(zn)),1
n) = (0n,1n). By PC part (i), (0n,1n)I(f)(0n,0n) and
so by consistency, (z′,1n) ∼ (z′,0n). By parallel reasoning, (z′′,1n) ∼ (z′′,0n).
Hence by transitivity of strict preference, (z′,0n) ≻ (z′′,0n)). But this is a con-
tradiction to PC part (ii).
Thus, it is not possible to measure the beneﬁt values in any one-part model
on a scale which permits arbitrary translation without exposing oneself to the
possibility of rank reversal. Contrast this with the main result (Proposition 3)
which shows that it is possible to measure the beneﬁt values in two-part models
on such a scale with no such risk.
The non-permissibility of translation in portfolio models which represent project-
wise coherent preferences is important for practical purposes, in that it shows that
the reason for the sorts of pathologies by the one-part model exhibited in Section 2
do not arise because of some quirk of the additive form: in fact they are much more
general. Moreover, as will be apparent in the next section, the idea of one-part
coherence gives actual operational guidance into how a natural baseline for mea-
surement can be ﬁxed to avoid the sorts of rank reversal pathologies documented
in Section 2.
7. Implications for practice
In this section, we return to the fundamental question: how should practising
analysts model problems like that of Section 2? CS are proponents of the additive
two-part model
∑
i
zixi+
∑
i
zi(1− xi) as a way of dealing with the baseline setting
issue. According to these authors ”it is best to consider each project individually
by explicitly scoring not doing the project on each attribute and using these scores
to calculate an overall project-speciﬁc score, voi [their notation], for not doing
project i.” (p260). Somewhat contra this view, we argue that there are cases
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where it is more natural to use one-part models. We illustrate our argument by
revisiting the case where a government funded medical research institute wishes
to select a portfolio of projects without spending in excess of a budget. The aim is
to develop medications for a potentially lethal disease (let us say diabetes). One of
the criteria for evaluation is impact on mortality. We argue that it is more natural
to use a one-part model rather than a two-part model in this case.
The principal reason is that a signiﬁcant attractive feature of the one-part
model
∑
i
bixi , is that one does not have to explicitly to identify the outcomes in
terms of how many people die from diabetes associated with not doing a project,
which may be contentious and not decision relevant. For example, knowing the
precise extent of diabetes in a population (as long as it is agreed that there is ”a
lot”) may not be relevant to decisions between a number of ”small” projects to
redress diabetes, since only once the projects become suﬃciently large that one
may run out of people to treat does the scale of the underlying health problem
become an issue. This is a real concern in economically underdeveloped countries
with poor systems of public health surveillance and death registration, estimating
how many people in the general population have a given disease and how many
people die from that disease to a high level of accuracy is for all practical purposes
impossible.
Suppose one agrees with these two reasons that it is more natural to implement
a one-part model scenario but wishes to assess value functions over the beneﬁts
(expressed in terms of reduction in diabetes mortality), with a view to trading oﬀ
mortality reduction against other criteria. We know from the example of Section
2 and Proposition 2 that we should avoid using interval scales so as not to expose
ourselves to the possibility of rank reversal. To do this we need to ﬁnd a natural
baseline for measurement of the value function which will not vary as we change
as we introduce new projects. In the spirit of the notion of ”one-part” coherence
of the previous section, the natural baseline for measurement is ”zero projects
implemented” which in this case means ”zero lives saved”. Note the contrast
between the CS suggestion and our suggestion - we are proposing that the baseline
for measurement of the beneﬁt of a project should not be the project-speciﬁc
concept of ”not doing a [ie the given] project” but rather the general concept of
”not doing any projects from the choice set at all”.
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To illustrate how this might work, let us return to the example of Section 2.
If one evaluates ”lives saved” relative to this ”zero projects implemented”/ ”zero
lives saved” baseline as the zero of the measurement scale, takes the level of the
most beneﬁcial project - ”6,000 lives saved”- as the unit and assumes a linear
value function, referring back to the original column of Table 1, one obtains value
scores of 1, 2/3, 2/3 and 1/2 for the diﬀerent projects respectively. Note that
this value measurement system does not give unique measurements: if we add an
extra project which saves 10,000 lives to the option set, we have to rescale the
value scores to get 3/5, 2/5, 2/5 and 3/10 for a,b, c, d respectively, but this simply
involves multiplying the original value scores by a common constant (a similarity
transformation), so the ranking of portfolios we obtain from summing up these
value scores is unaﬀected. Proposition 2 tells us that whenever we want to add
up value scores in this way, we can only be sure that our measurement system
will not induce a rank reversal of portfolios if the permissible score transformation
are similarity transformations. This is the reason that the original procedure of
Section 2 gets us into diﬃculties. Now, because we have chosen a baseline which
is independent of the choice set and does not change when we add projects, we no
longer have to worry about rank reversals.
As a matter of fact, this approach of setting a so-called ”do nothing” baseline
has been used widely in the multicriteria context in practice, in papers as early as
e.g. Bana e Costa et al. (1999, 2002). Indeed, this is what is done in the case study
presented in Phillips and Bana e Costa (2007) (despite these authors’ advice to
set the 0 at the level of the least preferred option). Hence we see the contribution
of this paper as being in part to justify the procedure of these authors, which
recognises the problem identiﬁed by CS but approaches its solution in a diﬀerent
and to our way of thinking more natural manner.
Hence, while we recognise the issue which CS raise, our view is that the solution
that they suggest - using
∑
i
zixi+
∑
i
zi(1 − xi) - is not always the most natural
modelling solution. It is perfectly possible to continue to describe problems using
the additive one-part model
∑
i
bixi as long as one takes care the the coeﬃcients
are measured in a way so that they are unique at least up to rescaling by a
ﬁxed constant, and a natural way to do this is to by using a do-nothing baseline
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for measurement which is independent of the set of projects being considered for
inclusion in the project portfolio. As part of the theoretic contribution of this
paper, our ”one-part coherence” axiom of Section 6 can give insight into the most
appropriate way to identify this baseline.
8. Conclusion
This paper has studied the issue of the choice of measurement scales to measure
project beneﬁts in multicriteria portfolio decision analysis using a derived measure-
ment frame, motivated by an issue in MCDA practice. The distinctive feature of
our frame here has been that we suppose that we have some measurements, and
some way of combining them, and wish the resulting derived measurement to have
certain consistency properties. We then ask what properties the underlying tech-
nology which has produced our measurements would have to have (bearing in mind
that these measurements may be from judgemental elicitation, from the use of the
techniques of professional disciplines such as accounting or epidemiology, or from
some actual physical measurement system).
We relate our conclusions back to our motivating questions as follows:
1. Can we get a clear view of what goes wrong when we use value functions to
value projects multicriteria portfolio decision analysis? We provide a small
toy example showing that, in an environment where additive functions are
used to combine project values, rescaling value functions by changing the
baseline of measurement can lead to rank reversals between portfolios.
2. What are the specific characteristics of value functions which give rise to this
problem? Might this problem apply more generally when project benefits are
assessed in some other way? In what way is this a specifically portfolio prob-
lem? As long as the one-part additive portfolio model is used to transform
project beneﬁt values to portfolio scores, beneﬁts have to be measured on a
scale on which the only permissible transformations are similarity transfor-
mations if rank reversals are to be avoided, but value functions are generally
taken to be interval scales: this is their problematic characteristic. This is
a speciﬁcally portfolio problem in the sense that whether using a particular
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scale for the measurement of beneﬁts leads to a rank reversal problem de-
pends on the nature of the portfolio model used to combine beneﬁt scores
- for example one could safely use interval scales for the measurement of
beneﬁt functions if a max function was use to transform value scores.
3. Why does the solution proposed by CS ”work” to resolve this problem? Is the
solution proposed by CS vulnerable to other similar and related problems?
In the alternative ”two-part” additive model which CS propose, the class of
transformations by which the beneﬁts can be rescaled without inducing a
rank reversal is the class of aﬃne transformations, so using value functions
is unproblematic in this context. But rank reversals can still be induced in
the two two-part additive models if beneﬁts are assessed on other scale types
(e.g. ordinal) and rescaling project values by an aﬃne transformation is still
a problem if a two-part multiplicative model is used – so two part models
are not immune to rank reversal problems if one is careless about the nature
of the scale on which the underlying beneﬁts are measured.
4. How important is the separability of the rule for combining project benefit
values as overall portfolio benefits in this analysis? Do the results we obtain
for this rule give insights into what should happen in a more general setting?
Even in the case of non-separable portfolio models, there is a clear diﬀerence
between the one- and two-part models, in that the one-part models can
never be used with beneﬁt scores assessed on scales which allow arbitrary
scale translation, whereas this is unproblematic in the case of the two-part
additive model.
5. What, practically speaking, can we learn from this analysis about how to
perform better and more robust analysis? We argue contra CS that one-
part models often provide a more natural frame for modelling, rather than
two-part models which require one to separately deﬁne and evaluate the
outcomes associated with each and every project. We show that our axiom
of one-part coherence provides a theoretically based way to identify a ”do-
nothing baseline” for value measurement. Consistent use of this baseline
rather than a shifting baseline which changes when the option set changes is
a natural way to establish a value scale with the necessary properties to be
used in portfolio analysis without the possibility of rank reversal.
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Our philosophy in writing this paper has been that mistakes (like the mistake
highlighted by CS) are worth studying in some detail as a close understanding of
how one has gone wrong in the past can ensure that one learns the right lessons
and does not overlearn (for example it is not the case that it is always wrong
to use interval scales to assess beneﬁt values when using one-part models), and
avoid making similar mistakes in the future (for example using interval scales in
the setting where one has two-part multiplicative models). We hope that the
discussion and ﬁndings in this paper will help researchers and practitioners draw
appropriate conclusions about how to assess beneﬁts in portfolio settings.
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